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ABSTRACT
Despite a large amount of effort devoted in the past years try-
ing to limit unsolicited mail, spam is still a major global con-
cern. Content-analysis techniques and blacklists, the most
popular methods used to identify and block spam, are begin-
ning to lose their edge in the battle. We argue here that one
not only needs to look into the network-related characteris-
tics of spam traffic, as has been recently suggested, but also
to look deeper into the network core, in order to counter the
increasing sophistication of spam-ing methods. Yet, at the
same time, local knowledge available at a given server can
often be irreplaceable in identifying specific spammers.
To this end, in this paper we show how the local intelli-
gence of mail servers can be gathered and correlated pas-
sively at the ISP-level providing valuable network-wide in-
formation. Specifically, we use first a large network flow
trace from a medium size, national ISP, to demonstrate that
the pre-filtering decisions of individual mail servers can be
tracked and combined at the flow level. Then, we argue that
such aggregated knowledge not only can allow ISPs to de-
velop and evaluate powerful new methods for fighting spam,
but also to monitor remotely what their “own” servers are
doing.
1. INTRODUCTION
According to IronPort’s 2008 Security Trend Report [8],
as much as 90% of inbound mail is spam today. Morever,
spam is no longer simply an irritant but becomes increas-
ingly dangerous. 83% of spam contains a URL. Thus, phish-
ing sites and trojan infections of office and home systems
alike are just one click away.
State-of-the-art spam filtering techniques are based on
content analysis (e.g. SpamAssassin [12]), host reputation
(SpamCop [13], Spamhaus [14]) or authentication services
(SPF [15], DKIM [1]). Yet, with the increased use of attach-
ment spam, success rate of content filtering decreases while
its cost increases. At the same time, despite the initial re-
ported success of blacklists, it has been shown recently that
their effectiveness is challenged by a new generation of low
profile, short-lived, and highly dynamic botnets used to send
spam [10].
Consequently, new methods are needed to keep up with
the spam arms race. One promising new approach to coun-
teract this development is to focus on network-level charac-
teristics of spammers. First, the network footprint of spam-
ming activity can not be adapted as easily as the content of
an email. Second, the rapid increase of spam traffic poses
significant processing, storage, and scalability challenges for
end-host systems, creating a need to at least perform some
fast “pre-filtering” on the network level. Although the email
content is not available in flow data, it can be used to profile
potential spammers according to activities on other protocols
and services offered. The network behavior of a legitimate
email server is likely to be very different from a user PC
acting as a botnet drone and sending spam.
To this end, a number of efforts have turned their atten-
tion towards network-level characteristics of spammers. For
example, in an interesting recent study Ramachandran et
al. [10] have studied spam with respect to IP address and AS
space and have demonstrated that clustering techniques can
be applied to detect target domain patterns that are similar to
those of spammers [11]. Link analysis in MTA graphs has
been applied by [3] to identify potentially malicious nodes.
Gomes et al. [6] showed that analysis of both static and
evolving graph models allows to discriminate between so-
cially unrelated spammer-receiver connections and socially
related legitimate email traffic. Finally, an extensive char-
acterization of spam traffic was given by Gomes et al. [7].
The authors highlighted differences between spam and legit-
imate emails with respect to a variety of aspects (not neces-
sarily network-related), such as workload, temporal patterns,
or sender and receiver distributions.
The majority of these works base their findings on mail
server logs (e.g. [10, 11]) while a smaller minority on net-
work flow data [2]. Log analysis provides detailed infor-
mation about the local SMTP traffic and the local spam fil-
tering knowledge (i.e. which connections got accepted or
rejected, along with the reasons thereupon) that goes far be-
yond simple reputation mechanisms, but is missing network-
wide traffic statistics. Collecting server logs from many
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email servers can somewhat improve the situation. Yet, gath-
ering logs from a large number of administration domains is
a tedious process also involving privacy issues. On the other
hand, flow data contains information for a much larger num-
ber of hosts, collected passively in the core of the network.
Furthermore, flow traces are not limited to SMTP traffic and
could allow one to correlate the behavior between different
protocols or services. Yet, flow traces do not contain details
about the content of SMTP sessions as they are restricted to
packet header information. Most importantly, they do not
right-away reveal the “identity” of a given connection with
respect to the endpoints intentions (legitimate, spam, scan-
ning, etc.).
We find that an “either/or” approach fails to combine the
advantages of both methods, and suggest a different direc-
tion. Our proposal is to try to exploit and combine the valu-
able (and non-overlapping) knowledge of local mail servers,
on a network-wide scale, without actually collecting or look-
ing at the individual server logs.
As a first step towards this goal, this paper presents two
main contributions. First, we show that email server’s pre-
filtering decisions can be accurately inferred directly from
flow traces and therefore collected at the network core as il-
lustrated in Fig. 1. In particular, the distributions of SMTP
flow properties, such as byte or packet count, reliably indi-
cate which SMTP sessions were closed by the server before
accepting contents. Based on this, MTA hosts can be classi-
fied as good or bad (sending spam) relying solely on packet
header information. Our approach is validated using server
logs and public black- and white-lists. In other words, spam-
mer identities and the countermeasures deployed by mail
servers become visible in flow traces.
To demonstrate the utility of these preliminary results, our
second contribution in this paper is to discuss a number of
potential applications that could benefit from our approach,
including anti-spam technique validation, global spam mon-
itoring, server monitoring, and novel network-level spam
countermeasures. In short, we believe that the rich informa-
tion offered by flow traces will be crucial in the fight against
current and next-generation spammers.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next
section, we describe our methodology and datasets used in
this study. Section 3 we present our results with respect to
the flow characteristics of accepted and rejected connections
on single-server, and network-wide scales. Section 4 de-
scribes a number of potential applications, as well as some
limitations of our approach. Finally, we conclude this work
in Section 5.
2. METHODOLOGY AND DATA
In this section, we briefly describe our methodology and
the datasets used for our study. As stated earlier, our goal is
to combine the local knowledge available at individual email
servers, on a network-wide level. To this end, we need first
a model of the network-level behavior of an email server.
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Figure 1: The ISP view of the network
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Figure 2: The three phases of email reception.
Consider the email reception process depicted in Fig. 2.
The first phase is the TCP three-way handshake initialized
by the client. In the second phase, the email envelope is sent,
according to the SMTP protocol [9]. At this stage, the server
may apply certain pre-filtering rules to early close SMTP
sessions from suspected spammers and in turn save valuable
network, CPU and storage resources. If the server decides to
go on, the email content is then transmitted in the third and
last phase1.
Here, we are interested in the pre-filtering phase. During
this phase, the server combines local and global knowledge
to decide whether a new connection is a spam attempt. Lo-
cal knowledge, for example, helps to decide whether the re-
ceiver address actually belongs to the server’s domain (open
relay attempt) or targets an existing user. Furthermore,
greylisting could be used as a local reputation-based service.
Global knowledge refers to the various open and commercial
services, known as “blacklists”, listing whether a sender has
been known to send unsolicited content in the past. Only if
1Note that an SMTP session can be used to submit several mes-
sages consecutively, sending again an envelope and a sequence of
data commands. Thus, a single SMTP session could be used to send
both spam and ham messages. However, analyzing our university
server log we found that only 1.5 % of all SMTP connections con-
tain more than one message. Therefore we assume that each SMTP
session is used to send either spam or ham but not both.
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Reject Reason Percentage
Blacklist Spamhaus 37.5%
R-Addr: user unknown 15.6%
R-Addr: invalid domain 18.3%
Helo: no FQDN 17.4%
Relay: denied 0.2%
Others 11.0%
Table 1: Reject reasons in pre-filtering.
the client does not “clear” the pre-filtering phase the SMTP
session is closed by the server2.
We analyzed the logs of a university email server and
show the top reject reasons in Table 1. As much as 78.3% of
the SMTP sessions were rejected in the pre-filtering phase.
Rejects based on local information (including many reasons
subsumed in Others) make up for roughly 45% of the reject
reasons. These results nicely illustrate the importance of lo-
cal mail server knowledge for spam detection.
Based on these findings, we are interested in answering
the following questions:
1. Do the various connections in the above log exhibit dif-
ferent enough flow characteristics to reliably identify
the decision of the server (accept, reject) and the na-
ture of a connection attempt (scan, spam, legitimate)
without looking at the log?
2. Do these flow characteristics carry over into the net-
work core when traffic from a large set of different
email servers (with possibly different filtering policies
or role) is aggregated?
To answer both questions, we utilize NetFlow data col-
lected by the border routers of a major national ISP serving
more than 30 universities and government institutions. The
IP address range contains about 2.2 million internal IP ad-
dresses and the traffic volume varies between 60 and 140
million NetFlow records per hour. We have used this data
to try to isolate patterns indicating the mail servers decisions
for SMTP flows.
To answer the first question (Section 3.1), we have iden-
tified in our NetFlow trace the flows corresponding to the
server log analyzed above. Preliminary results show that it is
indeed possible to tell spammers apart from legitimate email
senders by looking at feature distributions such as flow size,
packet count and bytes per packet. This is feasible because
in each phase of the email reception process, the number
of transferred bytes and packets is significantly higher than
during the previous phase.
To answer the second question (Section 3.2) we extend the
scope to the entire network. In our flow traces, we see traffic
2We note that additional post-filtering is performed subsequently
on accepted emails, based on their content. However, this post-
filtering is not visible in the logs or flow data, and thus is orthogonal
to our method. Our goal is to improve the pre-filtering phase, in
order to alleviate the heavy load imposed on post-filtering.
from more than 50 mail servers. In this case, it would be im-
possible to get the logs of all servers and perform a similar
study, due to administrative and privacy concerns. Instead,
in order to validate our results in this second experiment, we
classified flows according to the membership of the sender in
either a black- or whitelist [14, 4] and compared their statis-
tics.
3. RESULTS
In this section, we present and discuss our preliminary re-
sults with respect to the flow characteristics of accepted and
reject SMTP flows.
3.1 Single server characteristics
We use the server logs to divide all flows into three
classes, namely accepted, rejected and failed connection at-
tempts. If we can find a matching session for a given flow
in the server log, we look into the respective log entry to de-
cide whether is was rejected in pre-filtering or accepted. If
no entry is present, the flow is labeled as a failed connection
attempt.
Fig 3 shows the distributions of flows sizes (a), packet
count (b), and bytes/packet (c) for flows arriving at the the
mail server. It is obvious that each flow class has very spe-
cific characteristics. Consider, for example, the flow size
seen in Fig. 3(a):
Failed connections: Mainly very small flows as only a
small number of packets is sent. 95% of these flows
have less than 300 bytes.
Rejected: Only 3% of flows are below 300 bytes. Most
flows are between 400 and 800 bytes. 99% of flows
have less than 1500 bytes.
Accepted: Only 5% of flows have less than 1500 bytes.
This distribution is dominated by email size distribu-
tion and reaches 50% at around 5000 bytes. This is
consistent with the findings of Gomes et al. [7].
The CDF for “all flows” is a superposition of the three
classes weighted by their relative probability of occurrence.
All three classes are visible in the CDF even though it is
dominated by the CDF of the rejected flows due to the fact
that around 80% of the flows are rejected.
Figure 3(b) shows the same graph for packet count instead
of byte count (flow size). The difference between rejected
and failed connections is very strong. However, the packet
count of accepted flows is not as distinctive as the flow size
in Fig 3(a), i.e., the accepted curve is closer to the rejected
curve.
The plots for bytes/packet in Fig 3(c) are similar to bytes
per flow but are upper bounded by 1500 bytes (the typical
MTU packet size of Ethernet). The average bytes per packet
of accepted flows are dominated by the transportation of the
email message whereas the rejected flows are dominated by
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Figure 3: Feature distributions of flows to a single server.
Category Bytes Packets Bytes/Packet
failed conn. < 300 < 5 < 100
rejected 300− 1500 5− 10 < 100
accepted > 1500 > 10 > 100
Table 2: Characteristic flow properties.
the SMTP envelope traffic. The later is again dominated by
sending only a small amount of data per packet, e.g. an email
address. This result suggests that it is possible to detect the
three different classes even if we have only one or two pack-
ets per flow, as it might be the case when packet sampling is
applied.
Characteristic ranges from Fig. 3 are summarized in Ta-
ble 2. These results demonstrate that it is possible to dis-
tinguish spam from ham, in the given mail server, with high
confidentiality by looking at simple flow properties.
3.2 Network-wide characteristics
The above classification was derived from the logs of a
single server. The question arises whether the results can
be extended to other servers in the network. To address this
question we now look at the total SMTP traffic of the 50
most active email servers of the network.
Because we could not get the server logs of all the servers
we classify flows according to the membership of the sender
in either a black- or whitelist. We are interested whether
flows originating from blacklisted hosts exhibit characteris-
tics similar to the rejected flows of the previous section. Sim-
ilarly, whitelisted hosts should mainly send accepted traffic
and thus exhibit according flow characteristics.
Exemplified for flow sizes, Figure 4(a) shows that, indeed,
the shape of rejected and accepted flows is nicely reflected
by the black-/whitelisted curves. The CDF of blacklisted
traffic rises in the region of 300 bytes and achieves a ratio of
92% at 1500 bytes. In contrast, the CDF ot the whitelisted
traffic stays on a low level of 10% up to 1500 bytes and starts
to increase above 1500 bytes.
Yet, the fraction of whitelisted flows below 1500 bytes is
not so small as for accepted traffic in Fig. 3(a). We assume
this is due to applied greylisting in servers, which leads to a
number of rejected flows even for whitelisted hosts. In ad-
dition, whereas the fraction of rejected flows smaller than
1500 bytes was 99% in Fig. 3(a), we now have a slightly
smaller ratio of about 92% for blacklisted flows. This means
that the ensemble of the top 50 servers has a less aggres-
sive pre-filtering configuration than the single email server
studied before. Also, if other servers use a blacklist that per-
forms worse than Spamhaus, the blacklist used by our server,
this effect would be expected. That also implies that less
knowledgeable servers could benefit from the knowledge of
servers that are better configured, that is, servers that exhibit
a sharper reject curve. Again, the curve of all traffic is dom-
inated by blacklisted flows.
Summing up, these results imply that the discriminating
power of the three metrics (bytes per flow, packets per flow,
and bytes per packet) with regard to spamming activity is
also valid in a network-wide setting.
4. DISCUSSION AND APPLICATIONS
Impact.
In this paper, we established a passive measurement
method for detecting the mail server’s acceptance of email
sending attempts. The method requires no additional com-
munication or configuration changes on the mail server.
To our best knowledge, this is the first method that scales
to large networks and passively transfers knowledge about
spam from the edge of the network (servers) to the core
(as shown in Fig. 1). Although the proposed method is
quite simple and based on few basic flow characteristics, we
believe it paves the way towards more sophisticated algo-
rithms for network-level spam detection that could success-
fully complement existing methods.
Servers at the edge of the network have local knowledge,
such as the user database or the email envelope, that is not
accessible at the core of the network. Further on, servers cor-
relate this knowledge with services (DBL, SPF) to improve
the accuracy of their decision. With the presented method it
is possible to concentrate the local decisions of several email
servers in the core of the network. This approach can be in-
terpreted as a distributed computer cluster where the email
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Figure 4: Flow sizes in the entire network (a), for selected servers (b) and traffic overview (c).
servers perform a detection algorithm on part of the global
SMTP traffic and we are then collecting the results.
Mail servers only see their own traffic. In the core of the
network we have the “bird’s eye view” over the activity of all
nodes. This allows to correlate the gained information from
one email server with the information of many others. Fur-
ther on, our approach is not restricted to SMTP traffic and,
therefore, one can try to find suspicious behavior in other
protocols, too (a subject of future work).
Although being only a first step, we believe the proposed
method has important potential applications in production
networks and also paves the way for future research in the
area of network-level and network-wide characteristics of
spam traffic. In the rest, we try to illustrate some of these
applications.
ISP Use Case.
Network-wide spam monitoring: By looking at the flow
characteristics of incoming email traffic, an ISP is now able
to estimate the total spam traffic collected by its network.
Furthermore, it is possible to focus on the statistics of a spe-
cific server and to detect potential performance problems.
For example, Figure 4(c) shows the three categories of flows
that arrive at an email server inside the network in 15 min.
intervals. On 18. Feb at 6:00, the server rejects up to 80,000
flows. We think that this event corresponds to a spam cam-
paign arriving at the server. During this time, the server
is probably overloaded and starts rejecting connection at-
tempts. Three similar events are visible at the end of the
week. These events are visible on other severs as well and
are therefore of a distributed nature. We believe that an ISP
could monitor its network thus, and re-act in near real-time
to such suspicious events.
As a second observation, note how the diurnal pattern of
rejected/failed flows has an offset of approximately 6h com-
pared to accepted flows. Since the local time zone of the
server is GMT+1h, this indicates that most spam to that
server is sent from time zone GMT-5h (including eastern
USA).
Internal server monitoring: In addition, the ISP could
rate servers by calculating the ratio of accepted vs. rejected
flows for each server. This ratio could be used to to detect
open relay servers or servers with a suboptimal pre-filtering
process, triggered by an unusually high number of accepted
flows. These misconfigured servers produce unnecessary
and costly traffic. The ISP can now take counteractive mea-
sures. For example, Fig. 4(b) shows the flow size curves for
different mail servers in our network. Some of the servers
perform a very aggressive pre-filtering (server A) while oth-
ers do not seem to care too much about it (server C).
By monitoring the three categories of outgoing SMTP
traffic, the ISP could infer the reputation of internal sources.
For example, the reputation could be calculated as the ra-
tio of accepted versus total flows. Based on this value, the
ISP would be able to detected blacklisted internal servers or
servers abused for a spam campaign. With the same method,
spamming botnet members inside the network could possi-
bly be detected by the ISP.
Rating external email sources: Further the internal servers
could be used as agents of a collaborative filtering sys-
tem. The external mail senders could be rated based on the
three categories of their incoming and outgoing SMTP traf-
fic. This system could be used to possibly even filter out
spam on the edge of the network. The rating of the external
email sources could be published as a service for other email
servers.
Given that an operator is already collecting flow data, e.g.
for accounting, the data required by the outlined applications
is already available. There is no need to correlate the traffic
again with different blacklists or other sources. The email
servers have already done this work. To implement a simi-
lar service without flow data, the ISP would have to contact
each mail server administrator to get access to their local
server log. This process is bound to be cumbersome or even
impossible due to privacy issues. With our approach only
one sensor must be maintained.
Limitations.
Tracing the footprints of pre-filtering methods in network
traffic has the inherent limitation that it only detects pat-
terns if pre-filtering is applied by servers in the first place.
However, in production environments it is the email admin-
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istrator’s intention to block spam as early as possible to save
network, CPU and storage resources. Pre-filtering is the pre-
ferred choice to achieve this. Moreover, pre-filtering allows
to reduce the amount of non-delivery messages to be sent [5].
Therefore, we believe it is reasonable to rely on the presence
of pre-filtering in production networks.
In principle, spammers could adapt to our method by pro-
longing the envelope phase, e.g. by sending multiple RCPT
or HELO commands or providing very long sender email ad-
dresses. However, any deviation from normal SMTP behav-
ior could again be detected and mail servers could enforce
the shortness of the envelope as there is no need to be overly
long.
5. CONCLUSION
Mail server administrators are engaged in an arms race
against spammers. They urgently need new approaches to
fight state-of-the-art attachment spam increasingly originat-
ing from low-profile botnet spammers.
In this paper, we demonstrated that simple flow metrics,
such as byte count, packet count, and bytes per packet, suc-
cessfully discriminate between spam and ham flows when
pre-filtering is deployed in mail servers. Thus, one could in-
fer individual mail server’s decisions with respect to the le-
gitimacy and acceptance of a given connection. This allows
an operator i) to concentrate dispersed mail server knowl-
edge at the network core and ii) to passively accumulate
network-wide spam statistics, profile filtering performance
of servers, and rate clients. Thus, the advantages of flow and
server log analysis finally meet at the network core. We be-
lieve this is an important step towards successfully fighting
spammers at the network-level.
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